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1. Introduction
Financial market frictions are an important part of the mechanism through which fluctua-
tions in the volatility of firm-level shocks are transmitted to the real economy.1 Similarly,
firm entry has been shown to act as a propagation mechanism for business cycle dynamics.2
In this paper, we bring these two ideas together. We first document the relationship between
idiosyncratic uncertainty and firm entry. Using a vector autoregression, in which we allow
for interaction between financial markets and the broader macroeconomy, we show that a
fall in firm entry and a widening of the interest rate spread occur when there is a rise in
idiosyncratic uncertainty. We then develop a model of firm entry and financial frictions -
with fluctuations in the volatility of firm-level demand shocks - consistent with this empirical
evidence.
We use our model to study dividend and labor-income taxation. We find that financial
frictions weaken the incentive to support firm entry. Financial frictions generate a trade-off
for fiscal policy when firm entry is endogenous. One the one hand, financial frictions lead
to a reduction in firm entry, which the policymaker would like to mitigate. On the other
hand, the policymaker accounts for the agency costs of default, which firms disregard due to
limited liability. In a calibrated version of our model, accounting for the increase in volatility
observed during the 2007-09 recession, we show that optimal dividend (labor)-income taxes
rise (fall) by up to 7 (1.5) percentage points. Optimal fiscal policy therefore involves a
switch away from supporting firm entry and towards supporting employment.
1Our focus on financial frictions and the volatility of firm-level shocks is similar to Christiano et al. (2014),
Gilchrist et al. (2014), and Arellano et al. (2018). Other channels through which idiosyncratic uncertainty
can affect the real economy are discussed in, for example, Bloom et al. (2018) and Senga (2018).
2For example, Clementi and Palazzo (2016) show that firm entry and exit play an significant role in the
amplification and propagation of aggregate shocks. Gourio et al. (2016) show empirically that reduced firm
entry leads to persistent negative effects on GDP.
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The model of firm entry we develop builds on Bilbiie et al. (2012). New firms enter after
paying a one-time cost, and each firm produces a differentiated good, under conditions of
monopolistic competition, with a one-period lag.3 We amend this setup in two directions.
We suppose each firm receives an idiosyncratic demand shock, which occurs after labor has
been hired, and production has taken place. This generates uncertainty over the revenue
a firm can generate from the sale of its product.4 We also assume firms finance their
labor requirements by borrowing working capital from financial intermediaries who operate
a monitoring technology similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).5 In this environment, firms
that produce goods with a relatively low level of ex-post demand default, and agency costs
mean that default is costly.
To understand the key mechanism in our model, consider the production decision of an indi-
vidual firm. Firms produce under limited liability, and they place zero weight on realizations
of demand in which profits are negative, since they no longer carry the risk of losses from
such realizations. With monopolistic competition, and uncertainty over firm-level revenue,
limited liability creates an incentive for each firm to expand production, in an attempt to take
advantage of a potentially good realization of demand. Expanding production, however,
amounts to committing to a greater level of borrowing, in advance, and increased borrowing
requires each firm to generate more revenue to avoid default.
New firms enter the market until their expected profit, conditional on not defaulting, is
3Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux et al. (1996) develop general equilibrium models with (pro-
cyclical) firm entry and monopolistic competition which feature endogenous static entry and instantaneous
zero profits.
4With idiosyncratic demand shocks, the price at which a good is sold (and hence, firm-level revenue)
is unknown when the hiring decision is made. The effect of price uncertainty, for a competitive firm, is
analysed in Sandmo (1971) and Hartman (1972).
5The financial frictions we consider are also similar to Bernanke et al. (1999), and firms require working
capital, which is complementary to labor (Jermann and Quadrini, 2012).
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sufficient to cover the cost of entry. The entry decision is subject to two opposing forces.
Due to limited liability, expected revenue is higher, and this encourages entry. However,
the minimum level of demand needed to avoid default is also higher, and this discourages
entry. Whilst the possibility of default has no negative effect on the production decision of
an individual firm, potential entrants weigh the possibility of increased revenues against the
probability of default. The latter effect dominates, so, in equilibrium, the mass of firms is
lower than when financial frictions are absent.
Now consider an increase in the volatility of firm-level demand shocks. In a more uncertain
environment, and with limited liability, firms expand production. The probability of default
rises, and this leads to a rise in the interest rate applied to working capital loans. With
fewer firms, there is a fall in aggregate output and total employment. Conditional on an
uncertainty shock, therefore, firm entry is procyclical, and firm default and the interest rate
spread, are countercyclical.
Having established the role of financial frictions for firm entry, we study dividend and labor-
income taxation. We show that financial frictions weaken the incentive to support entry. To
understand this result, it helps to consider the case without financial frictions. Firm entry
reduces profit per-firm (a profit destruction effect) but raises product variety (a consumer
surplus effect).6 Dividend-income should be subsidized - and firm entry encouraged - because
the profit destruction effect is relatively weaker than the consumer surplus effect. In this
case, with monopolistic competition, firm entry is inefficiently low.7
Since financial frictions reduce the mass of firms in the economy, it would appear likely that
6This result is discussed in Bilbiie et al. (2008, 2016). Chugh and Ghironi (2015) show that, in the
long-run, this result is independent of the whether lump-sum taxes are available.
7Our analysis is based monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. We discuss the role of
the consumption aggregator below, but leave the possibility of, for example, oligopolistic competition or
translog preferences - both of which would generate an endogenous markup - to future research.
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optimal policy should further subsidize dividend-income. In the absence of agency costs, it
is optimal to increase the subsidy to dividend-income. With agency costs, however, there is
a trade-off for fiscal policy, because, whilst firms neglect such costs, the government accounts
for the societal cost of default. This means it is optimal to limit firm entry. In general, the
socially optimal number of firms declines with agency costs, and so does the optimal subsidy
to dividend-income. If we interpret this in terms of the standard result, with financial
market frictions, firm entry is instead inefficiently high.
Our model also has a second margin: labor supply. When firm entry is endogenous, labor-
income should receive a subsidy equal to price-markup (Bilbiie et al., 2008). In our analysis,
the subsidy to labor-income depends on the markup and the interest rate spread, and this
introduces a second role for agency costs. As the volatility of firm-level demand rises, the
markup falls - reducing the optimal subsidy to labor-income - but the interest spread rises -
raising the subsidy. Taken together, the trade-off that characterizes the subsidy to dividend-
income applies to labor-income. Therefore, during a recession, optimal fiscal policy involves
a switch away from supporting firm entry and towards supporting employment.
We assess the main results of our paper quantitatively. To put our analysis into context,
we focus on the Great Recession of 2007-2009 - a period characterized by an unprecedented
increase in uncertainty and a drop in firm entry. Keeping dividend and labor-income taxes
fixed, our model implies a (maximum) drop in firm entry of around 25 percent and a rise
in the default rate of 1.5 percentage points. Optimal policy acts to raise (lower) dividend
(labor)-income taxes by up to 7 (1.5) percentage points. As a point of comparison, we also
consider a change in the labor-income tax, of 1 percent point, during the second quarter of
2009, consistent with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.8 This policy indirectly
8Zubairy (2014) considers the Recovery Act of 2009, and focuses on the joint implications of a 1 percentage
point cut in the labor-income tax, alongside anticipated rises in government spending, the latter from which
we abstract.
5
supports firm entry, and thereby raises the agency costs of default.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the design of fiscal policy when product variety is
endogenous and our results on optimal fiscal policy are closely related to Chugh and Ghironi
(2015). An important finding, in the context of our analysis, is the result that dividend
and labor-income taxes should not respond to aggregate shocks when preferences are of the
Dixit-Stiglitz type.9 This allows us to provide an analytical characterization of optimal fiscal
policy when there are financial frictions. In general, we find that dividend and labor-income
taxes should be time-varying. The design of fiscal policy with endogenous product variety
has also been studied in environments with physical capital (Coto-Martinez et al., 2007),
long-run risk (Croce et al., 2013), and oligopolistic competition (Colciago, 2016).10
The transmission mechanism through which fluctuations in the volatility of idiosyncratic
shocks are propagated to the real economy has been discussed in a number of recent papers.
For example, in Christiano et al. (2014), a widening in the distribution of productivity
shocks increases the fraction of defaults, and in Gilchrist et al. (2014), financial frictions
magnify shocks to firm-level uncertainty through movements in credit spreads. Arellano et
al. (2018) argue that the majority of the decline in employment during the 2007-09 recession
can be explained by an increase in firm-level volatility. Since firm entry plays an important
role in aggregate fluctuations, our results provide a potentially different route through which
financial frictions and idiosyncratic uncertainty can affect the macroeconomy.
Finally, our paper is related to a large literature on firm entry and exit. Our approach is
most similar to Bilbiie et al. (2012). To their model of firm entry, we allow for endogenous
9In Chugh and Ghironi (2015), the extent to which profits should be taxed is also discussed in the context
of preference aggregation. We choose to work with a form of preferences that lead to constant taxes to focus
on the role of financial frictions.
10Lewis and Winkler (2015) analyse tax policy in a static model with firm entry. Edmond et al. (2018)
analyze the cost of markups with firm heterogeneity and firm entry.
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default by incorporating ex-post firm-level heterogeneity, a working capital constraint, and
financial frictions. A complementary approach to studying firm entry and exit, which
amends Hopenhayn’s (1992) model with ex-ante heterogeneous firms to allow for investment
in physical capital and aggregate shocks, is developed by Clementi and Palazzo (2016). Our
modelling choices - which imply a symmetric employment decision by firms in equilibrium -
are driven by the desire to generate analytical results. A general point, however, is that, in
either setting, firm entry is a form of investment in which up-front costs incurred to start a
business generate expected future profits.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we motivate our theoretical work by analyzing
the link between idiosyncratic uncertainty and firm entry using a vector autoregression. We
study a static general equilibrium model of firm entry and financial frictions in section 3 and
derive analytical expressions for the optimal mix of taxes on dividend and labor-income in
section 4. In section 5, we develop a dynamic version of our model, and in section 6, we
undertake a quantitative analysis, where we revisit the results on fiscal policy, motivated by
the increase in uncertainty during 2007-09. A final section concludes.
2. Motivation and Empirical Evidence
This section provides motivation for the theoretical analysis to follow. We begin by plot-
ting quarterly birth and death rates for US establishments and proxies for idiosyncratic
uncertainty.
========= Figure 1 Here ==========
The upper panel of Figure 1 reports establishment birth and death rates over the period
1993:Q2-2015:Q1.11 Birth and death rates are pro and countercyclical, respectively, and
11Data on establishment entry and exit is available from from the BLS’s Business Employment Dynamics
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change significantly during the 2007-09 period. The lower panel of Figure 1 reports three
proxies for idiosyncratic uncertainty. The first proxy is based on the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Business Outlook Survey, BOS; the second proxy is the interquartile range of
firm-level sales growth, sIQR, and is based on Compustat data; the final proxy, iVOL, is that
proposed by Gilchrist et al. (2014), and uses stock returns for US non-financial corporations.
In all cases, uncertainty is countercyclical. To gauge the increase in uncertainty during the
2007-09 recession, we regressed each uncertainty proxy on a dummy variable covering this
period. Our estimates suggest that, during the recession, uncertainty was about 20 percent
above its long-run average.12
To understand the relationship between firm entry, uncertainty, and financial frictions, we
use a vector autoregression model, with net firm entry, a measure of uncertainty, the interest
rate spread, and real per capita GDP.13
========= Figure 2 Here ==========
In Figure 2, we report impulse responses to a one standard deviation innovation in uncer-
tainty, for each proxy. Following an increase in uncertainty, net entry falls, with a peak
response of around 0.3 and 0.4 percent, at between 10 and 12 quarters. There is a similar
database from 1993:Q2 onwards. The general cyclical pattern of entry and exit we report was first established
by Campbell (1998), who studied (employment weighted) entry and exit rates for US manufacturing plants
over 1972:Q2-1988:Q4.
12See Appendix A. In all cases, the correlation of these proxies with net entry is negative. The correlation
of uncertainty with net entry varies between −0.06 (BOS) and −0.44 (sIQR) and the correlation between
these two particular measures of uncertainty is 0.3.
13We order the variables [uncertainty, spread, net entry,GDP ]
′
and use a Cholesky decomposition to
identify the uncertainty shock. The construction of these variables is discussed in Appendix A.
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pattern of adjustment for GDP and a marked rise in the interest rate spread.14 To a large ex-
tent, these results accord with Bachmann et al. (2013) and Gilchrist et al. (2014). Changes
in uncertainty have an immediate effect on the macroeconomy and uncertainty plays a role
in determining conditions in financial markets.
In our theoretical analysis, we also consider optimal dividend and labor-income taxes. One
result we emphasize is that subsidies (taxes) on dividend-income should decrease (increase)
when there are financial frictions. There is an established negative effect of corporate tax-
ation on firm entry. For example, Da Rin et al. (2011), find a negative effect of corporate
income taxation on entry rates, using industry-level panel data for 17 European countries,
and Djankov et al. (2010) find a 10 percentage point increase in the first year effective corpo-
rate tax rate reduces the average entry rate by 1.4 percentage points, across 85 countries.15
3. Analytical Model
In this section, we develop a static general equilibrium model of firm entry and financial
frictions. We explain how a change in the volatility of idiosyncratic demand can generate a
reduction in firm entry, a drop in GDP, and a widening of the interest rate spread.
3.1. Model Economy
The economy is populated with a measure nt > 0 of firms and a measure one of households
and financial intermediaries. Each firm has a linear production technology and supplies a
14To check for robustness, we re-ordered the VAR, with the spread first, i.e.,
[spread, uncertainty, net entry,GDP ]
′
. In this case, uncertainty shocks produced qualitatively simi-
lar results. We also experimented by replacing the spread with the GZ spread of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012). Again, we found similar results.
15It is less common to study the impact of taxation on firm exit. However, Colciago et al. (2017) present
evidence that a reduction in taxation results in an immediate drop in firm exit, with a delayed response of
firm entry, using quarterly data for the US.
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differentiated good. New firms are created each period by paying a one-time cost. House-
holds consume a basket of goods and supply labor to firms. Financial intermediaries hold
deposits from households and issue intra-period working capital loans to firms. If a firm has
sufficient revenue, it repays it’s loan to the financial intermediary. If not, the firm defaults,
and the intermediary repossesses the assets of the firm, subject to a cost of receivership.16
At the beginning of the period, new firms are created, and households place deposits with
financial intermediaries. Firms then make an employment decision and sign a contract
with a financial intermediary to cover their working capital requirements.17 Production
takes place, and idiosyncratic demand, ε ≥ 0, is realized. Firms with a sufficiently high
level of demand, ε ∈ [ε?t ,∞), sell their goods to households. Firms with a low level of
demand, ε ∈ [0, ε?t ), default. Households receive net-of-tax dividend and labor-income,
interest payments on deposits, and a lump-sum transfer from the government. At the end
of the period all firms exit.18
Households Each household draws utility from a composite of goods, Ct, and disutility
from aggregate labor, Lt, according to the following additively separable function,
u (Ct, Lt) (1)
which is strictly increasing and strictly concave in Ct and strictly decreasing and strictly
convex in Lt. Total consumption is, Ct =
{
n−ωt
∫
i∈Ω [ε (i)× ct (i)]θ di
}1/θ
, where ct (i) is
the consumption of good i ∈ Ω, and 1/ (1− θ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The
parameter ω controls consumer love of variety.19 The integration over the probability space,
16Our formulation is equivalent to all firms selling their production and the financial intermediary bearing
the burden of unpaid loans.
17The timing restriction we place on the firm is similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
18At this point, we distinguish exogenous exit from default, because only the latter is associated with
agency costs. We discuss this in more detail below.
19When ω = 0, we have standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. When ω = 1− θ, we eliminate love of variety,
and consumers are indifferent between consuming nt units of a single good or 1 unit of nt identical goods.
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Ω, is nt
∫
dG (ε), and G(ε) is the cumulative distribution function of idiosyncratic demand
shocks.20
The representative household maximizes utility, subject to the budget constraint, Ct =(
1− τLt
)
wtLt, where τ
L
t < 1 is a labor-income tax. This leads to a standard labor-leisure
equation,
−uL (t)
uC (t)
=
(
1− τLt
)
wt (2)
where uC (t) and uL (t) denote the marginal utilities, evaluated at time-t. The household
also chooses consumption, ct (i), to minimize the cost of acquiring Ct, taking prices and
income as given. This leads to a downward-sloped demand curve for each good, which we
express as,
ct (i) =
[
pt (i, ε)
n−ωt ε (i)
θ
]−1/(1−θ)
Yt (3)
where pt (i, ε) is the price of good i in units of consumption and Yt is aggregate output.
Firms Each firm produces a differentiated good with technology,
yt (i) = lt (i) (4)
where yt (i) is output and lt (i) is employment. Firms use working capital to finance pro-
duction, and this requires a loan, at gross rate rt ≥ 1, equal to wtlt (i).21 The profit of firm
i, with demand ε, is,
pit (i, ε) = pt (i, ε) yt (i)− wtrtlt (i) (5)
20Similar to Bernard et al. (2011), the firm-level shock reflects product attributes, or product appeal.
Midrigan (2011) refers to this shock as a quality shock.
21The interest rate on loans, rt, is strictly greater than the interest rate on deposits. The deposit rate is
exogenous in the static version of the model.
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where pt (i, ε) yt (i) are sales and wtrtlt (i) is debt.
Throughout the analysis, we assume firms operate under limited liability and act as though
profit is bounded from below at zero. This implies a threshold level of demand, ε?t , deter-
mines the mass of firms unable to meet their debt obligations ex-post. This endogenous
threshold level of demand is defined as, ε?t ≡ inf {ε (i) : pit (i, ε) > 0}, and the probability of
default is G (ε?t ) =
∫ ε?t
0
dG (ε), where G′ (ε?t ) > 0.
Each firm chooses an employment level, subject to demand and technological constraints,
given by equations (3) and (4), and market clearing, ct (i) = yt (i), to maximize conditional
expected profits, pi (ε?t ) ≡
∫∞
ε?t
pi (i, ε) dG (ε). To economize on notation, in what follows, we
drop the i index. Profit maximization implies,[∫ ∞
0
εθdG (ε)
](1−θ)/θ
nαt (ε
?
t )
θ = wtrt and θ
∫ ∞
ε?t
1
1−G (ε?t )
εθdG(ε) = (ε?t )
θ (6)
where α ≡ [(1− θ)− ω] /θ.22 The first condition in equations (6) determines the mass of
firms, nt, as a function of the marginal costs of production, wtrt - the wage rate multiplied by
the interest rate on working capital loans - the threshold level of demand, ε?t , and the average
demand for all goods,
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
, which is exogenous. The second condition implicitly
determines the threshold. Although we have yet to determine the general equilibrium of the
model, we see that, in this case, ε?t is independent of the macroeconomy. Thus, for given
costs of production, a higher default rate, G (ε?t ), is associated with a smaller mass of firms.
There is an unbounded mass of potential firms and the creation of a new firm is subject to
an entry cost. Firms enter until the conditional expected profit, net of taxation, τt < 1, is
equal to the cost of entry. The free entry condition reads,
(1− τt) pi (ε?t ) = fe (7)
22The details of the firm optimization problem are presented in Appendix B.
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where the cost of entry, fe > 0, is specified in units of output, similar to Jaimovich and
Floetotto (2008).23
Financial Intermediaries Each financial intermediary receives deposits and issues work-
ing capital loans. The expected assets of a financial intermediary are the revenue from the
repayment of loans and the assets from liquidated firms, less the cost of receivership, φ > 0.
Financial intermediaries are competitive and earn zero profit, which leads to,[∫ ∞
ε?t
dG (ε) +
∫ ε?t
0
(
ε
ε?t
)θ
dG (εt)
]
rt = 1 + φ [G (ε
?
t ) /wtlt] (8)
where
∫∞
ε?t
dG (ε) is the survival probability of a firm and
∫ ε?t
0
(
ε
ε?t
)θ
dG (εt) is the ratio of
assets-to-loans of defaulting firms. The liabilities of financial intermediaries are given by
rdtwtlt, where r
d
t = 1 is the normalized interest rate on deposits. Equation (8) defines the
interest rate on working capital loans and the interest rate spread.
Equilibrium Labor market equilibrium requires,
Lt = ntlt (9)
Equation (9) implies that, for given levels of aggregate employment, Lt, fewer operating
firms, nt, translates into an increase in firm-level employment, lt.
The resource constraint of the economy is,
Yt = Ct + fent + φ [ntG (ε
?
t )] (10)
where Yt =
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
ltn
1+α
t is aggregate output, fent represents investment at the
extensive margin, and φ [ntG (ε
?
t )] is the resource cost associated with default.
23As emphasized by Djankov et al. (2002), entry costs not only reflect the time and effort of the en-
trepreneur, but also bureaucratic and transactions costs required for setting up a business. Also see
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011).
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3.2. Changes in Volatility
In this section, we study a change in the volatility of idiosyncratic demand shocks. We show
that a rise in volatility leads to a reduction in firm entry, a fall in GDP, and a widening of
the spread applied to working capital loans.
To generate analytical results we assume demand shocks are lognormally distributed, with
probability density function,
g (ε) =
1
εσ
√
2pi
exp
[
−(ln ε−m)
2
2σ2
]
(11)
where m and σ are the location and scale parameters and E (ε) = 1. From this point
onwards, when we refer to the volatility of idiosyncratic demand shocks (or, volatility), this
corresponds to the parameter σ. Since E (ε) = 1, a rise in volatility is also a mean preserving
spread.
Proposition 1 When idiosyncratic shocks have a log normal distribution, the default thresh-
old, ε?t , and the probability of default, G (ε
?
t ), increase with the volatility of idiosyncratic
shocks, for G (ε?t ) < 1/2.
Proof See Appendix B. 
We have already established a negative relationship between the mass of firms in the economy
and the threshold level of demand, for given costs. Proposition 1 says that the same idea
applies when we consider volatility. More volatile economies feature fewer firms and more
defaults.
Before discussing the variables analyzed in section 2, we determine the aggregate markup.
The average price of all goods in the economy (i.e., including those firms that default)
is, pt ≡
∫∞
0
pt (ε) dG(ε). Using the demand curve, equation (3), we determine pt =
14
nαt
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
. This expression says that the average price depends on the mass
of firms and the average level of demand. We then link prices with marginal costs, wtrt,
using equations (6).
pt =
κ (ε?t )
θ
wtrt ; κ (ε
?
t ) ≡
∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)∫∞
ε?t
1
1−G(ε?t )ε
θdG (ε)
(12)
where κ (ε?t ) < 1 and κ
′ (ε?t ) < 0 is an adjustment to the standard markup,
1
θ
, which results
from monopolistic competition and CES preferences.24 Thus, financial frictions reduce the
aggregate price-markup, a result we explain in the following way. Because firms operate
under limited liability, when making an employment decision, they place zero weight on
realizations in which profits will be negative. Since the loss from a low realization of
demand is zero, there is an incentive for the firm to produce a higher level of output, with
a lower expected price.
We also associate a higher threshold, ε?t , with a volatility-induced recession, so, conditional
on a shock to volatility, the aggregate markup is procyclical in our model (we show κ (ε?t )
falls with volatility in Appendix B). Whilst there is considerable evidence for countercyclical
markups (e.g., Bils (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)), Nekarda and Ramey (2013) ar-
gue that aggregate price markups are pro- to acyclical unconditionally, and Born and Pfeifer
(2017) present evidence that price markups are procyclical, conditional on an uncertainty
shock. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), and very recently, Gilchrist et al. (2017) study
price-markups when there are financial frictions, and Etro and Colciago (2010) and Lewis
and Poilly (2012) study price-markups and firm entry.25 The mechanism in our model dif-
24We define the conditional price as, p (ε?t ) ≡
∫∞
ε?t
1
1−G(ε?t )pt (ε) dG (ε), and we find, p (ε
?
t ) =
wtrt
θ , which
says that financially unconstrained firms have higher (constant) markups.
25Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) document that during regional and macroeconomic recessions, more
financially constrained supermarket chains raise their prices relative to less financially constrained chains.
Gilchrist et al. (2017) document that liquidity constrained firms increased prices in 2008, while their uncon-
strained counterparts cut prices.
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fers considerably to these papers, the former of which assume customer markets, and latter,
oligopolistic competition.
We now discuss the macroeconomic and financial variables analyzed in section 2. As a simpli-
fication, we assume uC (t) = 1/Ct, which allows us to express total employment as a function
of the threshold and dividend and labor-income taxes. Total employment is decreasing in
the threshold and taxes.26 Aggregate output and the mass of firms are determined by the
following expressions,
Yt =
[∫ ∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
nαt Lt and nt = (1− τt)
(
1− θ
fe
)
1−G (ε?t )
κ (ε?t )
Yt (13)
The first condition in equations (13) is aggregate output. This condition is only dependent
on financial frictions to the extent that frictions affect the mass of firms in the economy.
The second condition in equations (13) is the free entry condition.
Consider the effect of an increase in volatility, σ. First, aggregate output depends on average
demand, which is equal to exp
[
(θ − 1) σ2
2
]
.27 Average demand is falling in volatility due
to Jensen’s inequality, which implies,
∫∞
0
εdG (ε) >
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
, for θ < 1. Thus, due
to the concavity of the aggregator function, a mean preserving spread will cause a fall in
aggregate output, for a given mass of firms. To explain how financial frictions affect output,
we use the entry equation, and note that as volatility rises, the term [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t ) =∫∞
0
εθdG (ε) /
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε) falls. This term reflects the two opposing forces that act on the
entry decision. Expected revenue is higher, because firms operate under limited liability, and
this encourages entry.28 However, potential entrants account for the increased probability
26The exact expression for Lt = L
(
τLt , τt; ε
?
t
)
is derived in Appendix B. For the result ∂Lt/∂ε
?
t < 0,
straightforward analytical solutions were unavailable, so we checked numerically using parameter values
consistent with our calibrated model (section 6).
27Given the distribution of idiosyncratic demand,
∫∞
0
εθdG (ε) is equal to exp
[
θm+ (θσ)
2
2
]
, where m =
−σ2/2, since E (ε) = 1.
28Firm sales are, s (εt) ≡ p (εt) yt =
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
](1−θ)/θ
nαt ε
θyt, and average sales, conditional on not
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of default, which depresses entry, and this effect dominates. Thus, in a volatility-induced
recession, firm entry (default) is pro (counter)-cyclical.
The overall implications of a change volatility also depend on consumer love of variety, which
is controlled by the parameter ω. A standard approach is to assume values ω ∈ {0, 1− θ},
where the former (latter) case corresponds to Dixit-Stiglitz (scale free) preferences. This
parameterization is of independent interest in our analysis because, given total employment,
it determines how financial frictions affect output. In particular, since output is unaffected by
the mass of firms once preferences are scale free, output is insulated from financial frictions,
and falls with volatility only through lower average demand,
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
. However,
this is not the case for firm entry, and in all cases, as volatility rises, there are fewer firms.
Finally, we consider the interest rate spread, rt > 1, which is determined by the zero-profit
condition for financial intermediaries. Re-writing equation (8),
rt =
1
1−G (ε?t )
{
1 +
1
θ
[
κ (ε?t )
1−G (ε?t )
− 1− φ (1− τt) (1− θ)
fe
G (ε?t )
]}−1
(14)
which makes it clear that the interest rate spread is increasing with volatility. This is
because the agency costs of default - which are controlled by the parameter φ ≥ 0 - rise with
volatility, and the probability of survival,
∫∞
ε?t
dG (ε), falls with volatility.29
4. Optimal Fiscal Policy
In this section, we study optimal dividend and labor-income taxes. We demonstrate that
financial frictions weaken the incentive to support entry.
Proposition 2
defaulting are, s (ε?t ) =
∫∞
ε?t
1
1−G(ε?t )s (εt) dG (ε). Using the definition for the markup adjustment, we have,
s (ε?t ) =
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ nαt lt
κ(ε?t )
.
29It is possible to generate a spread, without agency costs (i.e., as φ→ 0), because the spread also depends
on the ratio of assets-to-loans of defaulting firms,
∫ ε?t
0
(
ε
ε?t
)θ
dG (εt).
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1. The optimal dividend-income tax is,
τt = 1− α
1− θ
κ (ε?t )
1−G (ε?t )
1
1 + fG (ε?t )
(15)
where α ≡ [(1− θ)− ω] /θ and f ≡ φ/fe.
2. The optimal labor-income tax is,
τLt = 1−
κ (ε?t )
θ
rt (16)
where rt ≥ 1 is determined by equation (8).
Proof See Appendix B. 
Proposition 2 says that, absent financial frictions (and with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences; ω = 0),
both dividend and labor-income should be subsidized at the monopolistic markup, with
τt = τ
L
t = 1− 1θ < 0. Dividend-income should be subsidized because the returns-to-variety
outweigh the reduction in profit per-firm implied by additional firm entry. This is a result
of a profit destruction effect and a consumer surplus effect when firm entry is endogenous.30
Labor-income should be subsidized because leisure is not subject to a markup and there is
a wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation of consumption and
leisure. From the perspective of our analysis, an equal subsidy to dividend and labor-income
is an important benchmark, and without financial frictions, equations (15) and (16) imply
there is no role for short-run stabilization policy.
We now characterize optimal policy with financial frictions. We start with the subsidy
to dividend-income. To understand the trade-off for fiscal policy when there are financial
frictions and firm entry is endogenous we define two wedges. First, at the societal level, we
30This terminology is taken from Grossman and Helpman (1991) and this trade-off is discussed in Bilbiie
et al. (2008, 2016) and Chugh and Ghironi (2015) both of which analyse a dynamic model without default.
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use the resource constraint, given by equation (10), to express the ratio of the marginal cost
to marginal benefit of firm entry in the following way.31
Λst ≡
1
1 + fG (ε?t )
α
1− θ
pi (ε?t )
fe [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t )
(17)
Second, at the decentralized level, because each potential entrant does not internalize the cost
of default, the marginal benefit of firm entry is the net-of-tax expected profit, (1− τt) pi (ε?t ),
and the cost of entry is fe > 0. The ratio marginal cost to marginal benefit is,
Λdt ≡ (1− τt)
pi (ε?t )
fe
(18)
The optimal dividend-income tax equalizes the societal and private margins on firm entry.
Since equations (17) and (18) only depend on ε?t , consistent with our discussion above, we
start by analyzing how a change in ε?t affects the optimal tax. An increase in ε
?
t implies a
higher default rate, G (ε?t ). As the default rate rises, the subsidy to dividend-income falls
(lower Λst), and it is optimal to restrict entry, relative to the case without financial frictions.
An increase in ε?t also leads to a fall in [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t ), which depresses entry. This has
the opposite effect to the change in the default rate, as far as optimal taxation is concerned,
since it requires raising the subsidy to dividend income (higher Λst).
Notice, as ω → 1 − θ, and love of variety is eliminated, equation (15) implies τt → 1; i.e.,
a 100 percent tax can be optimal, a possibility discussed in Chugh and Ghironi (2015).32
One interpretation of this result, is that, for any ω ∈ [0, 1 − θ), the policymaker faces an
additional trade-off when there are financial frictions, but without love of variety, since there
31The social benefit of firm entry is output. At a given level of employment, output increases with the
number of firms, and the marginal benefit is, ∂Yt/∂nt = αYt/nt. The social costs of entry are the cost of entry
and default, and the marginal costs are, fe+φG (ε
?
t ). Thus, the ratio of marginal social benefits to marginal
costs is, (αYt/nt) / [1 + fG (ε
?
t )] fe. In appendix B, we show that pi (ε
?
t ) = (1− θ)Ytnt [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t ).
32In this case, absent financial frictions, we are left with only the profit destruction effects (the reduction
in profit per-firm) from additional firm entry.
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is no reason to support entry, the trade-off is eliminated. There is a second case in which
taxation can be optimal. When f is relatively high, so are the costs of receivership, and the
trade-off generated by financial frictions worsens. However, whilst a fall in love of variety
and a rise in the cost of receivership have similar normative implications (at least from the
perspective of the taxation of dividend-income), the latter directly affects the interest rate
applied to working capital loans.
Proposition 3 The dividend-income tax is procyclical for f > f ?, where f ? > 0 is defined
in Appendix B.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Proposition 3 characterizes the response of the subsidy to dividend-income to a change
in volatility. Whist, for relatively low costs of receivership, it may be optimal to rise
subsidies during a recession, as these costs rise, it becomes optimal to restrict firm entry.
We emphasize the following point. Even in a recession, with reduced firm entry, it may
not be optimal to encourage entry because the endogenous component of default costs are
relatively high. These societal costs are disregarded by firms because they act under limited
liability.
We now consider the subsidy to labor-income. The presence of financial frictions lowers the
markup charged by firms. Without financial frictions, κ (ε?t )→ 1, and so the adjustment to
the optimal labor-income subsidy is a reflection of a change in the markup under financial
frictions. Despite this, due to the presence of the interest rate spread, the trade-off identified
for dividend-income policy is also relevant for labor-income policy. Eliminating the spread
in equation (16),
τLt = 1−
1
1− (1− θ) [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t )− α/ [1 + 1/fG (ε?t )]
(19)
When there is a rise in ε?t , there are offsetting effects. Since [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t ) falls, this
implies a reduction in the subsidy to labor-income. However, since α > 0, and G (ε?t ) rises
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with ε?t , this implies a higher subsidy to labor-income. This result also holds when we
consider a change in volatility, and the relative strength of these effects depends on agency
costs. For relatively larger values of f , the subsidy to labor-income should rise with volatility.
Therefore, during a volatility-induced recession, optimal fiscal policy involves a switch away
from supporting firm entry and towards supporting employment.
5. Dynamic Model
In this section, we develop a dynamic version of our model. In doing so, we allow for a
gradual adjustment in the number of firms, with noninstantaneous zero profits. We also
assume the government finances an exogenous stream of public spending through dividend
and labor-income taxes, and by issuing state-contingent government debt.33
Time is indexed by, t = 0, 1, 2... In each period, there is a measure of nt > 0 firms,
each producing a differentiated good, and ne,t > 0 entrants, which produce in period t + 1.
Preexisting firms and new entrants have a probability δ of exiting. Since exit occurs after
production and entry have taken place, and the total mass of firms in period t + 1 is,
nt+1 = (1− δ) (nt + ne,t). Firms require an intra-period working capital loan to produce
their good. Firms that receive a low realization of demand, ε ∈ [0, ε?t ), are financially
constrained, and default. Defaulting firms generate agency costs, whilst firms that exit for
exogenous reasons do not.
5.1. Households
Lifetime utility is,
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (Ct, Lt), where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor.
Households place deposits, dt, with financial intermediaries, and purchase shares, xt, in
firms. They also have access to a complete set of state-contingent government bonds, Bst+1.
33These two changes bring our analysis closer to that of Bilbiie et al. (2012) and Chugh and Ghironi
(2015).
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Households maximize their expected lifetime utility, subject to the following flow budget
constraint,
dt +
∑
s
1
rst
Bst+1 + Ct + (nt + ne,t)xtvt =
(
1− τLt
)
wtLt + [(1− τt)pi (ε?t ) + vt]ntxt−1
+rdt−1dt−1 +B
s
t (20)
where rdt and r
s
t are the rates of return on deposits and bonds, and vt is the price of the firm
at the end-of-period t, after the realization of uncertainty. Household decisions over bonds
and deposits are characterized by the following consumption Euler equations,
uC (t) = βEtr
s
tuC (t+ 1) and uC (t) = βEtr
d
t uC (t+ 1) (21)
The optimal condition for equity is,
vt = β (1− δ)Et
{
uC (t+ 1)
uC (t)
[
(1− τt+1) pi
(
ε?t+1
)
+ vt+1
]}
(22)
Under this formulation, once a firm defaults, its value is retained, and sold in the following
period.
5.2. Firms
Each firm has production function, yt = atlt, where at is aggregate technology. We write
the instantaneous profit function of a firm as,
pit = max
{
εθnαt
[∫ ∞
0
εθdG (ε)
](1−θ)/θ
l
1−θ
t yt − wtrt
(
lt +
fo
at
)
, 0
}
(23)
where fo > 0 is a quasi-fixed overhead cost, denominated in units of labor, and lt is average
firm-level employment, which is taken as given by the firm.34 The introduction of an over-
head cost - a cost distinct from firm entry - has two roles. First, there is an interaction
34In our specification the entire wage bill is borrowed in advance. Evidence for this assumption is presented
in Lewis and Poilly (2012).
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between the threshold level of demand and firm-level employment, which is absent in the
static model. All else equal, higher overhead costs imply higher default rates, so we use over-
head costs to help match default rates in the data.35 Overhead costs also play a role in total
employment. Bartelsman et al. (2013) suggest that firms’ use of overhead labor accounts
for approximately 14 percent of total employment in US manufacturing establishments.
Firms maximize conditional expected net worth, zt (ε
?
t ) ≡ max [(1− τt) pi (ε?t ) , 0]+vt, subject
to demand and technological constraints, and the optimal level of employment is,∫ ∞
ε?t
[
θεθ − (ε?t )θ
(
lt
lt + fo/at
)]
dG(ε) = 0 (24)
In the static model, this condition was self-contained, and it implicitly determined the thresh-
old, ε?t (see equation (6)). With overhead costs, fo > 0, this is no longer the case.
There is an unbounded mass of potential firms each period, and the creation of a new firm is
subject to an entry cost, fe > 0, specified in units of output. Since prospective entrants are
forward-looking, firm entry occurs until the expected present discounted value of post-entry
profits, net of taxation, τt < 1, is equal to the cost of entry. The free entry condition reads,
vt = Et
∞∑
j=1
Mt,t+j (1− τt+j) pi
(
ε?t+j
)
= fe (25)
where Mt,t+j ≡ [β (1− δ)]j [uC (t+ j) /uC (t)] is a stochastic discount factor.
5.3. Government
The government collects dividend and labor-income taxes and issues state-contingent real
debt to finance an exogenous constant stream of government spending, G > 0. The flow
government budget constraint is,
τtntxt−1pi (ε?t ) + τ
L
t wtLt +
∑
s
1
rst
Bst+1 = Bt + G (26)
35Absent overhead costs, our model still generates default. However, matching default rates, in this case,
requires higher firm-level volatility.
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where ntxt−1pi (ε?t ) + τ
L
t wtLtτt is government income from taxation.
6. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we undertake a quantitative analysis of the model developed in section 5.
We first outline the calibration of the steady-state. We then consider a one-time shock to
the volatility of idiosyncratic demand and aggregate technology. Finally, we study optimal
fiscal policy, focusing on the increase in volatility observed during the 2007-09 recession.
6.1. Parameterization and Calibration
This section discusses the parameterization and calibration of the steady-state of the model.36
Each period is a quarter and we set β = 0.99. This implies the annualized real interest rate
is 4.1%. We adopt the following functional form for period utility,
u (Ct, Lt) = lnCt + χ
(1− Lt)1−υ − 1
1− υ (27)
The scale parameter, χ > 0 in equation (27), is set such that that households allocate 20
percent of their time to work in the steady-state, and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
with respect to wages - here equal to uL/uLLL > 0 - is assumed to be 1/υ = 0.72, based on
the empirical evidence in Heathcote et al. (2010). The elasticity of substitution between
differentiated goods is set at θ = 3.8.37 This value is based on Bernard et al. (2003)
and implies a markup of 35.7 percent.38 For fiscal variables, we assume the government
expenditure-to-output is G/Y = 0.2, and dividend and labor-income taxes are assumed to
36For the purposes of calibration, we revert to the assumption that the government has a lump-sum transfer
available to balance its budget.
37We assume Dixit-Stiglitz preferences throughout this section.
38Hall (2018) finds that the average US markup (weighted by value-added shares) increased from 1.12 in
1988 to 1.38 in 2015 in KLEMS data. A similar rise in markups is reported in De Loecker and Eeckhout
(2017).
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be τL = 0.25 and τ = 20, based on values reported in Arseneau and Chugh (2010) and
Gourio and Miao (2010).
We calibrate the remaining parameters of the model to steady-state targets. Table 2 presents
the parameters and their respective targets.
===== Table 1 Here =====
An important concern in our analysis is the volatility of idiosyncratic demand shocks. We
calibrate volatility using sales data from Compustat. In Figure 1, we reported the time
series of the interquartile range of sales growth. We map this interquartile range into
the distribution of sales produced by our model. Recall that firm-level demand is log-
normally distributed, and period t sales are given by, εθnαt
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
](1−θ)/θ
lt. This
implies the logarithm of period t sales are normally distributed, with mean −θσ2t /2 +
ln
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
](1−θ)/θ
nαt lt, and standard deviation θ
2σ2t . Since sales growth is the ratio
of two log-normals, it is also log-normal, and at the steady-state has mean zero and stan-
dard deviation θ22σ2. With θ chosen, we set σ to match the average interquartile range in
the data.
The annual rate of firm exit, over the period 1993-2015, is 11.78 percent, based on BED data.
Given the law of motion for firms, we use the parameter δ > 0 to target this exit rate.39
Giesecke et al. (2011) report that historical annual value-weighted mean default rate for US
non-financial firms is 1.52 percent (Table 1, page 237). For the 1993-2015 period, the all-
rated, issuer-weighted default rate, reported in the 2018 annual report of Moody’s Investors
Service (Ou et al. (2018), Exhibit 30), was also 1.52 percent. Given the interquartile range
39Since default occurs prior to exit shock, the parameter δ > 0 captures the change in the total mass of
products consumed in the economy.
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of sales growth, we use overhead costs, fo, to target this default rate.
40 Finally, we target an
interest rate spread of 241 basis points using the agency cost parameter, φ.41 The implied
cost of default in our model 0.45 percent of steady-state GDP and the use of overhead labor
is 4.3 percent of total employment.
6.2. Macroeconomic Implications of Aggregate Shocks
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the model’s endogenous variables in response to
two aggregate shocks: a shock to volatility (σ) and a shock to aggregate technology (a).42
We assume volatility and technology follow independent AR(1) processes,
ηt+1 = Ληt + εt+1 ; ωt+1 ∼ N (0, V ) (28)
where ηt = [ln (σt) , ln (at)]
T and ω = [εσ, εa]T is the vector of shocks. We set the persistence
of technology to 0.979 and the standard deviation of innovations to technology at 0.0072.
Based on the estimates of Glichrist et al. (2014), we set the persistence of volatility to 0.9
and the standard deviation of innovations to volatility at 0.04.43
Figure 3 depicts the behavior of key endogenous variables in response to a positive shock to
volatility of one standard deviation.
===== Figure 3 Here =====
40Dropping overhead costs, default falls to 0.34 percent, based on the other calibrated parameter values.
41Since firms make identical employment decisions, they face the same interest rate spreads, and we use
the agency cost parameter in a similar way to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
42We study model dynamics by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the steady-state.
43Glichrist et al. (2014) use firm-level sales data from Compustat to estimate idiosyncratic technology
shocks, which, in our model, are observationally equivalent to demand shocks. Using an estimated DGSE
model, with data covering 1985-2010, Christiano et al. (2014) find the volatility of innovations to idiosyncratic
productivity to be 0.07.
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The immediate effect of an increase in volatility is a reduction in firm entry (ne,t) of around 1
percent. The number of operating firms begins to fall one period (quarter) after the shock.
With constant exogenous exit, net entry is negative (nt+1 − nt = ne,t − δ (nt + ne,t) < 0),
until quarter 12, when the number of operating firms begins to recover (nt+1 > nt). Firm
entry, however, is below its long-run level until quarter 18.44 The change in the mass of
operating firms is also consistent with a variety effect, which is reflected in the average price,
pt = n
α
t
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
.45
In the static model (section 3), the impetus for a reduction in firm entry came from a fall in
profits. In the dynamic model, the drop in firm entry also reflects the change in expected
future profits. Although firm-level profits fall sharply, upon impact, they rise quickly back
to their long-run level, and then change sign. This feature of the model is consistent with
the idea that it is possible for a firm to benefit from increased volatility by a good realization
of demand. This positive effect of volatility on firm entry manifests itself in an expansion
in firm-level production, and is consistent with an Oi-Hartman-Abel effect. As Bloom
(2014) discusses, the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect implies that firms can expand to exploit good
outcomes and contract to insure against bad outcomes, making them potentially risk loving.
In our model, we see this as a rise in the conditional demand for goods, which is defined as,
∆ (ε?t ) ≡
[
1
1−G(ε?t )
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
.46
The negative effect of volatility on firm entry (and that which dominates) is the increase
in the default rate, G (ε?t ) =
∫ ε?t
0
dG (ε). This occurs endogenously, via the threshold, ε?t ,
44Using a circumflex denotes the log-deviation of a variable its steady-state value, net entry is, n̂t+1− n̂t =
δ (n̂e,t − n̂t), and so in quarter 12, both entry and the mass of firms are n̂e,t, n̂t < 0.
45Variety effects are also present in the analysis of Bilbiie et al. (2012) and Chugh and Ghironi (2015).
46Average sales, conditional on not defaulting are, s (ε?t ) =
∫∞
ε?t
1
1−G(ε?t )s (εt) dG (ε), or, s (ε
?
t ) =
[∆ (0)]
1−θ
n
1/θ−1
t [∆ (ε
?
t )]
θ
yt, where ∆ (ε
?
t ) is a revenue shifter, which is exogenous from the perspective
of the individual firm, and ∆ (0) ≡ [∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
is average demand.
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and for exogenous reasons, via the process for volatility, σt.
47 In the static model, the
threshold level of demand, ε?t , was proportional to conditional demand, whilst in this case,
using equation (24), we have, (ε?t )
θ lt = θ (lt + fo) [∆ (ε
?)]θ. Despite this interaction, terms
associated with the threshold - i.e., the default rate and the interest rate spread - return
back to their long-run levels relatively quickly, whilst the nature of firm entry and exit is
such that expansion of firm production is longer-lasting.
We started with an assertion that financial frictions are an important part of the trans-
mission mechanism through which fluctuations in uncertainty are propagated to the real
economy. In Figure 3, shocks to volatility cause recessions; GDP and consumption both
fall, and the default rate and interest rate spread both rise.48 A natural question is, to what
extent do financial frictions matter for our results. Absent financial frictions, a change in
volatility works entirely through average demand,
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
, which acts like aggregate
technology, since it only enters the equilibrium conditions of the economy though aggregate
production. However, changes in volatility have a small effect on demand, meaning that
the fall in firm entry, for example, is a magnitude smaller than the when there are financial
frictions.
Figure 4 depicts the behavior of key endogenous variables in response to negative technology
shock of one standard deviation.
47We have, G (ε?t ) =
∫ ε?t
0
g(x)dx, with the PDF defined in equation (12). In linear terms, this is the sum of
three components. G (ε?) Ĝt = [g (ε
?) ε?] ε̂?t +
[∫ ε?t
0
σ dgdσ (x)dx
]
σ̂t +
[∫ ε?t
0
m dgdm (x)dx
]
m̂t, where the final two
terms are exogenous. In Figure 3, we plot the path of G (ε?) Ĝt and ε̂
?
t . Since g (ε
?) ε? is a small number,
any change in ε̂?t will only cause a small change in G (ε
?) Ĝt. Since, σ
2
t /2 = −mt, a rise in volatility will
generate a fall in mt, depressing any change the default rate.
48Wages also fall in recessions. The response of wages and the specification of entry costs is an important
consideration for our analysis. We experimented with entry costs specified in units of labor. Despite higher
default, this can encourage firm entry, because entry costs also fall.
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===== Figure 4 Here =====
A negative technology shock leads to a large and persistent fall in firm entry and GDP. The
interest rate spread rises, but only in the initial period, and the default rate, which operates
via the threshold, ε?t , rises slightly, upon impact. As in Bilbiie et al. (2012), our model
can be interpreted as a real business cycle (RBC) model, where the number of operating
firms acts as the capital stock of the economy. In this sense, the results in Figure 4 can
be compared to the analysis of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997): whereas Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) seeks to understand the role of agency costs using an RBC model, we use a model of
firm entry. In the RBC setting, agency costs generate persistence in output, but defaults are
procyclical; with endogenous firm entry, defaults are countercyclical, but there is relatively
less additional persistence.
6.3. Tax Polices and the 2007-09 Recession
Using the dynamic model developed above, we now revisit the results on dividend and labor-
income tax policies. To put our analysis into context, we analyze the response of optimal
taxes, accounting for the increase in volatility observed during the 2007-09 recession. In
particular, we map the rise in volatility during this period into our model by specifying
a series of unanticipated shocks to volatility that reproduces the path of the interest rate
spread used in our empirical analysis (section 2). Absent changes in fiscal policy, this rise
in volatility causes a maximum drop in GDP of around a 0.5 percent, considerably less than
during 2007-09.49 We therefore also specify a series of unanticipated shocks to technology
(over the same time horizon) that generate a drop in GDP, consistent with the 2007-09
49Our model does not contain many of the ingredients needed to provide such a drop in output. When
Basu and Bundick (2017) feed a macro-uncertainty shock (of a size consistent with the 2007-09 recession)
into their baseline model, the drop in output is around 0.6 percent, which is comparable with our results.
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period.50
Our analysis of fiscal policy also differs from section 4 because we study optimal policy
without the availability of a lump-sum transfer. In this case, we solve for optimal dividend
and labor-income taxes using the following reduced policy problem.
Definition 1 Plans Ξt ≡ {Ct, Lt, ne,t, nt+1,lt}∞t=0 and {ε?t}∞t=0 represent the optimal allocation
if they solve the following problem.
max
{Ξt,ε?t }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Lt, ξ)
+βtλ1,t
{
nαt
[∫ ∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
atltnt − Ct − G − ne,tfe − φ [ntG (ε?t )]
}
+βtλ2,t
[
Lt − nt
(
lt +
fo
at
)]
+ βtλ3,t [(1− δ) (nt + ne,t)− nt+1]
+βtλ4,t
{
lt
[
ε?t
∆ (ε?t )
]θ
− θ
(
lt +
fo
at
)}
− ξA (29)
where,
U(Ct, Lt, ξ) ≡ u(Ct, Lt) + ξ [uC(t)Ct + uL(t)Lt] (30)
and given,
A ≡ uC(0)
[
rd−1d−1 + b0 + n0z (ε
?
0)
]
(31)
where {λj,t}4j=1 are lagrange multipliers associated with constraints, ξ is a (constant) lagrange
multiplier associated with the implementability constraint.51
50Throughout this exercise, it is assumed that the process for volatility (technology) has persistence equal
to 0.9 (0.8).
51As in standard Ramsey taxation problems, the government is assumed to commit, as of period zero, to
time invariant policy functions for t ≥ 1. Following Chugh and Ghironi (2015), we also assume that the
schedule of state-contingent profit taxes is posted one period in advance.
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Finally, we consider the implied tax change that resulted from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which was enacted as a direct result of the 2007-09
recession.52 We model this change in taxation as a 1 percent point unanticipated drop in
the labor-income tax during 2009:Q2, a period in which volatility (in our model) is 12.8
percent above its steady-state value.53
Figure 5 depicts the behavior of the model’s endogenous variables, beginning in 2007:Q3, for
three cases; optimal policy, an unanticipated cut in the labor-income tax in 2009:Q2, and
fixed dividend and labor-income taxes.
===== Figure 5 Here =====
By construction, the path of the interest rate spread and GDP (with fixed taxes) in Figure
5 corresponds to the data, for the first 12 quarters.54 There are two important points to
note from this exercise. First, both firm entry and the mass of firms fall strongly in 2009,
and have a close match with the data, in terms of their size. As Siemer (2014) reports, the
2007-09 recession exhibited a 5 percent decline in the number of firms, which was driven by
a 25 percent decline in the number of entrants. Second, the default rate also rises (at its
maximum) by 1.5 percentage points, although this is somewhat below that which occurred
during the 2007-09 period. Both of these variables matter for the optimal tax decision
because they determine agency costs.
52In early 2009, the US Congress passed a 787 billion USD package to stimulate the economy, of which
tax incentives to individuals (companies) comprised around one third (one sixteenth). Since the largest
component of tax incentives to individuals, close to 116 billion USD, was in the form of payroll tax credits,
we model policy under the ARRA as a cut in the labor-income tax rate.
53Zubairy (2014) also models ARRA payroll tax credits as a 1 percent point cut in labor-income taxes.
Mertens and Ravn (2011) discuss the role of anticipated and unanticipated tax policy shocks.
54We choose 12 quarters to capture the rise and fall of volatility over this period. The results in Figure 5
are robust to changes in the length of this mapping.
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Figure 5 shows the extent to which financial frictions weaken the support for firm entry.
As with the static model, during a recession, the default rate rises, and this acts to raise
agency costs. Whilst firms disregard such costs, the policymaker accounts for the societal
costs of default by discouraging entry, raising the tax applied to dividend-income. With
volatility at levels consistent with the 2007-09 period, this translates into a rise in the tax
rate of up to 7 percentage points.55 Whilst raising taxes on dividend-income discourages
firm entry, the drop in the tax applied to labor-income (of up to 1.5 percentage points)
supports employment. In doing so, it provides indirect support to firm entry - this also
occurred in the static model (see the discussion prior to equations (13)). Despite lower
taxes on labor-income, overall, under optimal policy, the drop in firm entry is around 10
percentage points higher than if taxes remain unchanged.
Now consider an exogenous (and unanticipated) drop in the labor-income tax in 2009:Q2,
which we interpret as a ARRA-type tax cut. Although this experiment is designed to
understand policies taken in response the 2007-09 recession, it also helps to explain how a
cut in labor-income taxes supports firm entry.56 In Figure 5, a 1 percent drop in the labor-
income tax generates a relatively large effect on employment, and this results in a smaller
fall in firm entry, upon implementation. Over time, this feature leads to a sizable difference
in the mass of firms operating in the economy. Since the default rates are similar across tax
policies, this means agency costs are relatively higher than when only labor-income taxes
are cut.
55The default rate (and interest rate spread) are relatively less sensitive to changes in dividend-income
taxation than they are to changes in volatility, which explains why, in Figure 5, the lines depicting default
rates, for fixed taxes and optimal policy, are close to one another.
56For the purposes of this experiment, we assumed a lump-sum transfer was available. This explains the
relatively larger fall in consumption, after period 9, with optimal taxes, since this policy accounts for the
implementability constraint. We set the persistence of the labor-income tax at 0.87, to be comparable with
Chugh and Ghironi (2015).
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7. Conclusion
This paper studies financial market frictions and firm entry over the business cycle. We
document empirically that a reduction in firm entry and a widening of the interest rate
spread occur when there is a rise in idiosyncratic uncertainty. We then develop a model of
endogenous firm entry and financial frictions, which features shocks to the volatility of firm-
level demand, and is consistent with this empirical evidence. Analyzing optimal dividend
and labor-income taxation, we find that financial frictions weaken the incentive to support
firm entry. In a calibrated version of our model, accounting for the increase in volatility
observed during the 2007-09 recession, optimal policy acts to raise (lower) dividend (labor)-
income taxes by around 7 (1.5) percentage points.
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Appendix A: Empirical Analysis
A1. Proxies for Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
We use three proxies for idiosyncratic uncertainty at the aggregate level.
1. BOS : We use the series “Future Activity Index” from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Business Outlook Survey and apply,
√
F ii,t + F
+
i,t −
(
F+i,t − F−i,t
)2
for each
month, similar to Bachmann et al. (2013), where F+i,t (F
−
i,t) is defined as the fraction
of firms in the cross section with increase (decrease) responses at month t. We then
make the series quarterly by averaging it across the three months within each quarter.
2. sIQR: We use the series SALEQ from Compustat. We keep firms with at least 100
quarters of observations, starting from 1970:Q1. We drop firms with negative sales
and use the observations since 1993:Q2. This gives an unbalanced panel of 2578 firms.
We calculate the growth rate of sales as (si,t − si,t−4) /12 (si,t + si,t−4), following Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992), where si,t are the sales of firm i, in quarter t, deflated by the
consumer price index.
3. iVOL: Caldara et al. (2016) construct a monthly series based in Gilchrist et al. (2014).
We make this series quarterly by averaging it across the three months within each
quarter.
A2. Uncertainty in the 2007-09 Recession
We regress each of the uncertainty proxies on a dummy variable for the 2007-09 recession
(NBER recession dates). Table A reports time-series OLS regression point estimates (with
standard errors below in parentheses).
===== Table A Here =====
34
The rise in uncertainty over the 2007-09 period was calculated by dividing the estimated value
of the coefficient on the dummy variable by the mean. For example, 0.035/0.187 = 18.7
percent.
A3. Other Aggregate Variables
Data cover the period 1993:Q2 to 2015:Q1. We use establishment births (ne,t) and es-
tablishment deaths (nx,t) from the BLS’s Business Employment Dynamics (BED) program;
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table9 1.txt. We use the Census Bureau’s Business Dy-
namics Statistics (BDS) so that the number of establishments in period t = 0 (i.e., n0) is
5, 630, 195. The total number of establishment is, nt = (ne,t − nx,t) + nt−1. The quar-
terly exit rate is (nx,t/nt) and the entry rate is (ne,t/nt). In the VAR, we use an index
(2005 = 100) of net entry index and per-capita GDP. We measure the interest rate spread
by the difference between the interest rate on BAA-rated corporate bonds and the 10 year
US government bond rate. These data are downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis (FRED); mnemonics GDPC1, CNP16OV, and BAA10Y. For robustness, we also
used the GZ spread downloaded from http://people.bu.edu/sgilchri/Data/data.htm.
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Appendix B: Analytical Model
Appendix B.1 (Firm i profit maximization and average prices)
The profit of firm i with demand level ε is given by, pit (i, ε) = pt (i, ε) yt (i)−wtrtlt (i). Firm
i maximizes conditional expected profit,
∫∞
ε?t
pit (i, ε) dG(ε), choosing an employment level,
lt(i), subject to technology, yt (i) = lt (i), demand, ct (i) =
[
nωt
pt(i,ε)
εθt
]−1/(1−θ)
Yt, and market
clearing, ct (i) = yt (i), where ε
?
t = inf {εt : pi (i, εt) > 0}. The maximization problem of firm
i is,
max
lt(i),ε?t
∫ ∞
ε?t
{
εθ
nωt
[
lt (i)
Yt
]θ−1
lt (i)− wtrtlt (i)
}
dG(ε)− λt
{
(ε?t )
θ
nωt
[
lt (i)
Yt
]θ−1
lt (i)− wtrtlt (i)
}
with the wage and interest rate, the mass of firms, and total output, given. The first-order
conditions imply,∫ ∞
ε?t
θ
εθ
nωt
[
lt (i)
Yt
]θ−1
dG(ε)− [1−G (ε?t )]wtrt = 0 (32)
Using the zero-profit condition with the first order condition, we have, θ
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG(ε) =
[1−G (ε?t )] (ε?t )θ. In equilibrium, all firms make the same decision, so lt (i) = lt, and,
(ε?t )
θ
nωt
(
lt
Yt
)θ−1
= wtrt. Using total production, Yt = n
(1−ω)/θ
t
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
lt, in the previ-
ous equation, we have,
[∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
](1−θ)/θ
n
[(1−θ)−ω]/θ
t (ε
?
t )
θ = wtrt. In the text we define,
α = [(1− θ)− ω] /θ.
Define ∆ (ε?t ) ≡
[
1
1−G(ε?t )
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
and ∆ (0) ≡ [∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
as conditional de-
mand and average demand. The price of a good with demand ε equals, pt (ε) =
εθ
nωt
(
lt
Yt
)θ−1
=
εθ [∆ (0)]1−θ nαt . The average price of all goods is defined as, pt ≡
∫∞
0
pt (ε) dG(ε). Ap-
plying this definition to demand, we have, pt = n
α
t ∆ (0). We use the firm optimization
conditions to link prices with marginal costs. Specifically, nαt ∆ (0) = [∆ (0)]
θ wtrt/ (ε
?
t )
θ and
[ε?t/∆ (ε
?
t )]
θ = θ imply,
pt =
[
∆ (0)
∆ (ε?t )
]θ
wtrt
θ
(33)
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In the main text, we define κ (ε?t ) ≡
[
∆(0)
∆(ε?t )
]θ
, which is expressed in equation (12). Formally,
we can show,
∂[∆(ε?t )]
θ
∂ε?t
=
dG(ε?t )
[1−G(ε?t )]2
∫∞
ε?t
[
εθ − (ε?t )θ
]
dG (ε) > 0 where ε > ε?t and ∆ (ε
?
t ) >
∆ (0). This implies that the markup is less than one, κ (ε?t ) < 1, and is falling in the default
rate, κ′ (ε?t ) < 0, where the default-threshold level of demand is implicitly determined by
[ε?t/∆ (ε
?
t )]
θ = θ.
Finally, define, p (ε?t ) ≡
∫∞
ε?t
1
1−G(ε?t )pt (ε) dG (ε), which is the conditional price per-firm. Ap-
plying this definition to the price equation, pt (ε) = ε
θ
t [∆ (0)]
1−θ nαt , generates, p (ε
?
t ) =
wtrt
θ
.
Thus, pt < p (ε
?
t ) and the conditional mark up is a constant. Now consider the firm problem
with unlimited liability. In this case, the average price is also equal to wtrt
θ
, so that we
confirm limited liability acts to depress the expected price.
Appendix B.2 (Proposition 1)
We start by proving there is a unique threshold level of demand, ε?t > 0. Our analysis
is based on the condition, θ∆ (ε?t )
θ = (ε?t )
θ. Drop time-subscripts and define H (ε?) ≡
1
1−G(ε?)
∫∞
ε?
(
ε
ε?
)θ
dG (ε). There is a unique solution to H (ε?) = 1
θ
, if −g
′(ε?)ε?
g(ε?)
is an increasing
function, and if lim
ε?→+∞
−g′(ε?)ε?
g(ε?)
= +∞, where g (ε?) is the PDF. To show this, note 1 −
G (ε?) =
∫∞
ε?t
dG (ε), and make the change of variables, u = ε/ε?, such that, H (ε?) ≡∫∞
1 u
θg(ε?u)du∫∞
1 g(ε
?u)du
. We then have,
H ′ (ε?) =
∫∞
1
uθ+1g′ (ε?u) du× ∫∞
1
g (ε?u) du− ∫∞
1
uθg (ε?u) du× ∫∞
1
ug′ (ε?u) du[∫∞
1
g (ε?u) du
]2 (34)
Now define a new CDF as G1(x) =
∫ x
1 g(ε
?u)du∫∞
1 g(ε
?u)du
and the elasticity of the PDF as η (ε?u) =
−g′(ε?u)ε?u
g(ε?u)
. We use this to re-write H ′ (ε?) as,
H ′ (ε?) = EG1(u
θ)EG1(η)− EG1(uθ × η) = −COVG1(uθ, η(u))
where COVG1 defines as covariance with respect to measure G1. As the covariance of two
increasing functions is positive, we have proved that H ′ (ε?) < 0.
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We can now verify that lim
ε?→0
H (ε?) ≡
∫∞
ε? ε
θdG(ε)/[1−G(ε?)]
(ε?)θ
= +∞ > 1/θ, since the nominator∫∞
ε? (ε)
θdG(ε)
1−G(ε?) is a regular function, and the denominator converges to zero.
Finally, we need to compute lim
ε?→+∞
H (ε?). To do so, we use L’Hospital’s Rule, as both
nominator and denominator converge to 0. We find,
lim
ε?→+∞
H (ε?) = lim
ε?→+∞
∂
∂ε?
∫∞
ε?
(
ε
ε?
)θ
dG (ε)
∂
∂ε?
(1−G (ε?) = limε?→+∞
−g (ε?)− θ
ε?
∫∞
ε?
(
ε
ε?
)θ
dG (ε)
−g (ε?)
= lim
ε?→+∞
[
1 + θ
(1−G (ε?))
g (ε?) ε?
H (ε?)
]
Therefore, the sufficient condition for lim
ε?→+∞
H (ε?) = 1 < 1/θ is that lim
ε?→+∞
1−G(ε?)
g(ε?)ε?
= 0,
which is an infinitely increasing log hazard ratio, lim
ε?→+∞
g(ε?)ε?
1−G(ε?) = +∞.
We now describe the properties of ε?, G (ε?), and µ (ε?t ) = [∆(0)/∆(ε
?
t )]
θ. In the text, we
adopt a log normal distribution, with PDF defined in equation (11). Define a transformed
threshold, x? = ln(ε
?)−m
σ
. Our main variables of interest are,∫ ∞
ε?
εθdG (ε) = exp
(
θ2σ2
2
)
Φ(θσ − x?); G (ε?) = Φ(x?);
[
∆(0)
∆(ε?t )
]θ
=
Φ(−x?)
Φ(θσ − x?)
where Φ(x?) is the CDF of the normal distribution,
Φ(x?) =
1√
2pi
∫ x?
0
exp
(
−x
2
2
)
dx and Φ′(x?) =
1√
2pi
exp
(
−x
2
2
)
Using 1−G (ε?) = Φ(−x?), we re-write the threshold equation as, θ ∫∞
ε?
εθdG(ε) = Φ(−x?) (ε?)θ,
and then,
exp (θσx) Φ(−x?) = θ exp
(
θ2σ2
2
)
Φ(θσ − x?) (35)
where 1 − G (ε?) = Φ(−x?). Now consider, Φ′(x?) = 1√
2pi
exp
[
− (x?)2
2
]
, and note that,
Φ′(θσ − x?) = 1√
2pi
exp
[
− (θσ−x?)2
2
]
, which implies,
Φ′(x?) = exp
(
σ2θ2
2
− θσx?
)
Φ′(θσ − x?) (36)
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Equations (35) and (36) generate,
Φ(θσ − x?)
Φ′(θσ − x?) =
1
θ
Φ(−x?)
Φ′(x?)
; θ < 1 (37)
We use equation (37) in what follows. To evaluate dx
?
dσ
we use threshold equation, as in equa-
tion (35), and apply the implicit function theorem. Multiplying through by exp (−θσx?),
using equations (35) and (36) to eliminating Φ(−x?) and Φ′(x?), respectively, implies,
dx?
dσ
= θ
(σθ − x?) Φ(−x?) + θΦ′(x?)
θσΦ(−x?)− (1− θ) Φ′(x?) (38)
The numerator is positive and the denominator is positive, if σθ > (1− θ) Φ′(x?)
Φ(−x?) . For this
condition to hold, it is sufficient that x? < 0, which is equivalent to Φ(x?) = G(ε?) < 1/2,
as claimed in the text. This also implies the probability of default increases with volatility.
Now consider how the markup depends on σ. Using equations (35), we have,
d
dσ
[
∆(ε?t )
∆(0)
]θ
=
d
dσ
Φ(θσ − x?)
Φ(−x?) =
d
dσ
1
θ
exp
(
θσx? − θ
2σ2
2
)
= σ exp
(
θσx? − θ
2σ2
2
)[
dx?
dσ
+ x? − θ
]
The following calculation shows that dx
?
dσ
+ x? − θ > 0, when σ < 1,
dx?
dσ
+ x? − θ = −x
?θΦ(−x?) (1− σ) + (−x? (1− θ) + θ) Φ′(x?)
θσΦ(−x?)− (1− θ) Φ′(x?)
This proves
dκ(ε?t )
dσ
< 0.
Appendix B.3 (Solution with Given Taxes)
At this point, we define D (ε?t ) ≡ [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t ). Now recall, pi (ε?t ) ≡
∫∞
ε?t
pit (ε) dG(ε) =∫∞
ε?t
[pt (i) yt − wtrtlt] dG(ε) = [1−G (ε?t )] [p (ε?t ) lt − wtrtlt]. Using the result above, that
p (ε?t ) =
wtrt
θ
, then pi (ε?t ) =
1−θ
θ
[1−G (ε?t )]wtrtlt. Total production is, Ytnt = nαt ∆(0)lt, where,
∆(0) ≡ [∫∞
0
εθdG(ε)
]1/θ
, and the firm optimization condition implies, wtrt = n
α
t [∆(0)]
1−θ (ε?t )
θ.
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So, wtrtlt =
Yt
nt
[
ε?t
∆(0)
]θ
= θ Yt
nt
D(ε?t )
1−G(ε?t ) , and pi (ε
?
t ) = (1− θ) YtntD (ε?t ) = fe/ (1− τt), by free en-
try. Using the resource constraint,
Yt = Ct + fent [1 + fG (ε
?
t )]⇔ Ct = Yt {1−D (ε?t ) (1− θ) (1− τt) [1 + fG (ε?t )]} (39)
Equating labor supply and demand, labor market equilibrium implies,
−uL (t)Lt = Yt
[
D (ε?t )
1−G (ε?t )
(
1− τLt
)
θ
rt
]
uC (t)
=
(
Yt
Ct
)
1
rt
[
D (ε?t )
(
1− τLt
)
θ
1−G (ε?t )
]
CtuC (t)
Finally, we determine interest rates using equation (8). Eliminate wages using the firms
optimal condition, apply Lt = Yt/n
α
t ∆ (0), and eliminate the mass of firm with free entry,
1
rt
=
∫ ∞
ε?t
dG (ε) +
∫ ε?t
0
(
εt
ε?t
)θ
dG (ε)− φ
fe
G (ε?t )
(1− θ) (1− τt) [1−G (ε?t )]
θ
Note that, by the threshold condition, (ε?t )
−θ = 1−G(ε
?
t )
θ
∫∞
ε?t
εθt dG(ε)
, and so,
∫ ε?t
0
(
εt
ε?t
)θ
dG (ε) =
1−G(ε?t )
θ
[
1
D(ε?t )
− 1
]
. This leads to,
1
rt
1
1−G (ε?t )
= 1 +
1
θ
[
1
D (ε?t )
− 1
]
− fG (ε?t )
(1− θ) (1− τt)
θ
; f =
φ
fe
(40)
which is reported in the main text as equation (14) for the case in which τt = 0. Notice
that the term 1
rt
1
1−G(ε?t ) appears in the labor market condition. Eliminating this term and
eliminating Yt using the resource constraint,
−uL (t)Lt
CtuC (t)
=
(
1− τLt
) 1−D (ε?t ) (1− θ) [1 + (1− τt) fG (ε?t )]
1−D (ε?t ) (1− θ) (1− τt) [1 + fG (ε?t )]
If we further assume CtuC (t) = 1 then total employment is constant. Recall, uL (t) < 0, so
the left-hand side of this expression is positive. Therefore, employment, Lt = L
(
τLt , τt, ε
?
t
)
,
is decreasing in τLt and τt, and for τt = 0, is independent of ε
?
t . In this case, the solution
to our model is summarized in the following way. The threshold equation, determines ε?t ,
40
and equation (40) determines the interest rate spread, rt. Since total labor supply is fixed,
the mass of firms and output are determined by free entry and the equation Yt = ∆(0)n
α
t L,
where α ≡ [(1− θ)− ω] /θ. In this case, firm-level employment is also determined. Finally,
equation (39) determines consumption, given output.
Appendix B.4 (Proposition 2)
The policy problem is find the set of taxes
{
τt, τ
L
t
}
that maximize utility, subject to the
equilibrium conditions of the model, as described in Appendix B.3. An immediate implica-
tion of the threshold condition is that ε?t > 0 is not a choice variable for government and, by
equation (40), neither is rt. Moreover, since we can pick τ
L
t (τt), labor supply (free entry)
constraints do not bind. Finally, the choice over wages means the labor demand constraint
does not bind. The policy problem reduces to,
max
Ct,Lt,nt
u (Ct, Lt) + λt {∆ (0)nαt Lt − nt [fe + φG (ε?t )]− Ct} (41)
with first-order conditions,
uC (t) = λt ; − uL (t) = λt∆ (0)nαt ; [fe + φG (ε?t )]nt = α∆ (0)nαt Lt
We determine the optimal tax on dividend-income using free entry, which implies, 1− τt =
fe/pi (ε
?
t ). Using the first-order condition for the mass of varieties,
[fe + φG (ε
?
t )]nt = αYt ⇔ 1− τt =
αfe
(1− θ) [fe + φG (ε?t )]D (ε?t )
(42)
which is reported as equation (15) in Proposition 2, replacing D (ε?t ) = [1−G (ε?t )] /κ (ε?t ).
To determine the tax on labor-income, we use the labor-leisure equation. Using the optimal
condition for labor, this implies,
−uL (t) = λt∆ (0)nαt ⇔ 1− τLt =
1−G (ε?t )
D (ε?t )
rt
θ
(43)
which is reported in the main text as equation (16), again replacing D (ε?t ). This condition
also contains the interest rate, which is only a (increasing) function of ε?t . To see why,
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start with equation (8), from the main text, and eliminate wages using the firms optimal
condition, and labor, using Lt = Yt/n
α
t ∆ (0). Then use the optimal mass of firms, from
equation (42),
1
rt
1
1−G (ε?t )
= 1 +
1
θ
[
1
D (ε?t )
− 1
]
− fG (ε?t )
α
D (ε?t )
1
θ [1 + fG (ε?t )]
(44)
which is directly comparable to equation (40), in Appendix B.3. Eliminating the spread from
the optimal tax on labor-income results in equation (19), which is reported and discussed in
the text.
Appendix B.5 (Proposition 3)
We drop time subscripts and suppress the ε? index to re-write the optimal tax on dividend-
income tax as, 1
1−τ =
1−θ
α
D (1 + fG), where D = (1−G) /κ. The optimal dividend tax
is the product of declining and increasing function, for which there is only one point of
inflection. We therefore evaluate,
α
1− θ
d 1
1−τt
dσ
= 0⇔ −dD
dσ
= f ?
(
D
dG
dσ
+G
dD
dσ
)
= f ?
d (GD)
dσ
(45)
where,
dG
dσ
= Φ′(x?)
dx?
dσ
> 0 and
dD
dσ
= Φ′(θσ − x?)
(
θ − dx
?
dσ
)
< 0
In what follows, we characterize f ? > 0. Applying these conditions to equation (45),
−Φ′(θσ − x?)
(
θ − dx
?
dσ
)
= f ?
[
Φ(θσ − x?)Φ′(x?)dx
?
dσ
+ Φ(x?)Φ′(θσ − x?)
(
θ − dx
?
dσ
)]
Recall equations (35) and (36), and use them to eliminate Φ(θσ − x?t ) and Φ′(θσ − x?),
respectively,
f ? =
(
dx?
dσ
− θ
){
[1− Φ(x?)] 1
θ
dx?
dσ
− Φ(x?)
(
dx?
dσ
− θ
)}−1
(46)
where has been used Φ(−x?) = 1 − Φ(x?). Note that equation (38) implies dx?
dσ
> θ under
the condition G < 1/2.
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Appendix C: Quantitative Model
Appendix C.1 (Model Summary)
The equations for the model economy are
===== Table C Here =====
The conditions in Table 1 form a system of equations which solve for {Ct, Lt, lt, nt+1, ne,t} and
{z (ε?t ) , pi (ε?t ) , ε?t} and
{
vt, wt, r
d
t−1, rt, r
s
t+1
}
, where Yt = ∆ (0)n
(1−ω)/θ
t lt, with government
expenditure, G > 0, and dividend and labor-income, {τt, τLt }, given.
Appendix C.2 (Derivation of the Implementability Constraint)
Multiply the household budget constraint - given by equation (20) in the text - by the
marginal utility of consumption, uC(t), impose the equilibrium condition xt−1 = 1, and
integrate forward. Use the labour supply and the dynamic Euler equations, uC(t) =
βEt [uC(t+ 1)r
s
t ]; uC(t) = βEt
[
uC(t+ 1)r
d
t
]
and vtuC(t) = β(1 − δ)Et
[
z(ε?t+1)uC(t+ 1)
]
.
Finally, use dynamic equation for product creation, nt = (1− δ) (nt−1 + ne,t−1), to write the
implementability constraint as,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [uC(t)Ct + uL(t)Lt] = A (47)
where A ≡ uC(0)
[
rd−1d−1 + b0 + n0z(ε
?
0)
]
is assumed to be exogenous.
Appendix C.3 (Reduced Optimal Policy Problem)
Following Chugh and Ghironi (2015), the policy maker picks τLt and commits to pick τ
d
t+1
in period t. The problem can be written as one of maximizing E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(Ct, Lt), subject
to all the conditions presented in Table 1, the present value constraint, given by equation
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(47), and ε?t > 0. Plans are made over {ne,t, nt+1, lt, Ct, Lt, pi (ε?t )}∞t=0, prices
{
wt, rt, r
d
t
}∞
t=0
,
tax rates,
{
τt+1, τ
L
t
}∞
t=0
and the default threshold, {ε?t}∞t=0. By choosing tax rates, however,
the constraints on the labor-leisure and the Euler equation for shares (i.e., product creation)
do not bind. Similarly, by picking wages and interest rates directly, the constraints on firm
pricing, the zero profit condition for financial intermediaries, and the Euler equation for
deposits do not bind. This allows us to re-write the reduced Ramsey policy problem as in
the text, where ε?t > 0.
Appendix C.4 (First-Order Conditions for Optimal Policy)
From the policy problem defined in the text, the conditions for {Ct, Lt, ne,t}∞t=0 are,
0 = uC (t)− λ1,t + ξ [uCC(t)Ct + uC(t)]
0 = uL (t) + λ2,t + ξ [uLL(t)Lt + uL(t)]
0 = −λ1,tfe + λ3,t (1− δ)
The conditions for {nt+1, lt}∞t=0 are,
0 = βλ1,t+1
[
(1 + α)
Yt+1
nt+1
− φG (ε?t+1)]− βλ2,t+1(lt+1 + foat+1
)
+ λ3,t+1 [β (1− δ)]− λ3,t
0 = λ1,t
(
Yt
lt
)
− λ2,tnt + λ4,t
{[
ε?t
∆ (ε?t )
]θ
− θ
}
Finally, the condition for {ε?t}∞t=0 is,
0 = −βtλ1,t [φntg (ε?t )] + βtltλ4,t
d
dε?t
[
ε?t
∆ (ε?t )
]θ
where we assume ηt = 0 as ε
?
t > 0. The final term in this expression is,
d
dε?t
(ε?t )
θ [∆ (ε?t )]
−θ =
θ
ε?t
[
1− ε
?
t∆
′ (ε?t )
∆ (ε?t )
] [
ε?t
∆ (ε?t )
]θ
and
ε?t∆
′(ε?t )
∆(ε?t )
< 1.
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Figure 1: Firm Entry and Exit Rates and Proxies for Idiosyncratic Uncer-
tainty57
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57Upper Panel. Private sector establishment births and deaths, seasonally adjusted. Source: Bureau of
Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Lower Panel. Uncertainty Proxies (for calculation, see Appendix
A). Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Business Outlook Survey (BOS), Compustat (sIQR),
and Caldara et al. (2016) (iVOL).
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Figure 2: Empirical Impulse Responses for an Uncertainty Shock58
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58Estimation is over the period 1993:Q2-2015:Q1. The VAR is specified with three lags. Each impulse
response is estimated from a separate VAR system (corresponding to an uncertainty proxy). Identification
is by Choleski decomposition with the uncertainty measure placed first. Both net entry and GDP are used
in log terms from an index in which 2005:Q1=100. The shaded areas are one standard error bootstrapped
confidence intervals using the system with iVOL. Appendix A contains details of the uncertainty proxies.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses for a Volatility Shock59
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59Notes: Percent deviations from steady state reported on the vertical axis (unless otherwise stated).
Quarters reported on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses for a Negative Technology Shock60
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54
Figure 5: Impulse Responses with Different Tax Policies61
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Table A: Uncertainty Regressions
Dependent Variable BOS sIQR iVOL
Recession Indicator 0.050
(0.020)
0.035
(0.012)
17.266
(3.441)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.700 0.187 50.823
Rise in Uncertainty
7.2% 18.7% 34.0%
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Table C: Summary of Quantitative Model
Description Equation
Labor market clearing Lt = nt
(
lt +
fo
at
)
Resource constraint at∆ (0)n
(1−ω)/θ
t lt − G = Ct + fene,t + φntG (ε?t )
Labor demand ∆(0)nαt =
[
∆(0)
∆(ε?t )
]θ
wtrt
atθ
Labor supply wt
(
1− τLt
)
= − uL(t)
uC(t)
Net worth z (ε?t ) = (1− τt) pi (ε?t ) + vt
Conditional expected profit pi (ε?t ) =
[
1−G(ε?t )
κ(ε?t )
]
nαt ∆ (0) at
[
(1− θ) lt − θ foat
]
Mass of firms nt+1 = (1− δ) (nt + ne,t)
Default Threshold
∫∞
ε?t
[
θεθt − (ε?t )θ
(
lt
lt+fo
)]
dG(ε) = 0
Financial intermediaries wtr
d
t−1 + fm
G(ε?t )
lt+φ/at
=
[∫∞
ε?t
dG (ε) +
∫ ε?t
0
(
ε
ε?t
)θ
dG (ε)
]
wtrt
Euler equation (equity) and free entry vt = β(1− δ)Et
[
uC(t+1)
uC(t)
]
z
(
ε?t+1
)
and vt = fe
Euler equations (deposits and bonds) 1 = βEt
[
uC(t+1)
uC(t)
]
rdt and 1 = βEt
[
uC(t+1)
uC(t)
]
rst
where ∆ (ε?t ) ≡
[
1
1−G(ε?t )
∫∞
ε?t
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
and ∆ (0) ≡ [∫∞
0
εθdG (ε)
]1/θ
.
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Table 1: Parameter Values used in Quantitative Analysis
Parameters Set Exogenously
Parameter Value Target/Source
Discount factor β 0.99 (β−4 − 1)× 100 = 4.01%
Frisch elasticity υ
(
1−L
L
)
0.74 Heathcote et al. (2010)
Elasticity of Substitution 1/(1− θ) 3.8 Bernard et al. (2003)
Sunk cost fe 1 Normalization
Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Source
IQR sales growth σ 0.130 18.68% Compustat (see text)
Default rate fo 0.012 1.52% Moody’s (see text)
Exit rate (annual) δ 0.029 11.78% BLS (see text)
Spread (annual) φ 0.285 241 b.p. FRED (BAA10Y)
Hours worked χ 1.381 20% -
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